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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

LITTLE COPYRIGHT DISPUTE ON THE PRAIRIE: UNBUMPING
THE WILL OF LAURA INGALLS WILDER

FRANCIS M. NEVINS*

I. AUTHOR, BOOKS, BACKGROUND1
The name of Laura Ingalls Wilder (1867-1957) is as well known around
the world as that of any American author who ever lived. At an age when most
people are in or near retirement she began writing the famous Little House on
the Prairie books that still sell millions of copies and generate millions of
dollars in income annually as the third millennium begins. Laura had been a
widow for many years and her marriage had produced only one child. Rose
Wilder Lane, Laura’s only daughter, was single, childless, and sixty-five years
old in February of 1952, when her eighty-four-year-old mother executed her
will. In that will Laura Ingalls Wilder left all her copyrights to Rose for the
balance of Rose’s life, and upon Rose’s death to the Laura Ingalls Library in
Mansfield, Missouri, which is a branch of the Wright County Library. Rose
died in 1968. Since her death, who owns the fabulously lucrative rights to the
Little House books and the other literary works of Laura Ingalls Wilder?
Every lawyer without expertise in copyright law, and every nonlawyer
whose views of what the law should be are shaped by common sense, would
hardly hesitate before replying: “Why, the library does, of course! What kind
of silly question is that?” But lawyers versed in copyright law and particularly
in its power to thwart authors’ wills would decline to reply before they were
given more facts; and upon learning those facts they might conclude that the
library has no rights in Wilder’s works at all. A recently filed lawsuit will
perhaps bring some sanity into the matter.2
Understanding the bizarre concept I have dubbed “will-bumping” requires
exposure to some elementary copyright law.3 The Constitution empowers
Congress: “To Promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing
* Professor of Law, Saint Louis University School of Law.
1. See generally JOHN E. MILLER, BECOMING LAURA INGALLS WILDER (1998).
2. Wright County Library Bd. v. Harper Collins Publishers, Inc., No. 99-3368-CV-S-3-ECF
(W.D. Mo. 1999). The case presents other issues, such as laches and the statute of limitations,
which are beyond the scope of this article.
3. For a more thorough discussion, see Francis M. Nevins, The Magic Kingdom of WillBumping: Where Estates Law and Copyright Law Collide, 35 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y 77 (1988).
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for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings and Discoveries.”4 Pursuant to this grant of power,
Congress passed the first federal copyright act soon after ratification of the
Constitution itself.5 From 1790 until the end of 1977, the term of copyright
protection for a work began upon the publication of the work in compliance
with various statutory formalities and lasted for a period of years thereafter.6
That period was divided into two copyright terms.7 During the first decades of
our existence as an independent nation, an author alone had the right to renew
a copyright; if he died during a work’s first term, at the end of that term the
work fell into the public domain.8 In 1831 the Copyright Act was amended so
that any work in whose first term the author died could be renewed by a class
of statutory successors consisting of the author’s surviving spouse and
children.9 Subsequent revisions of the statute extended the length of the terms
but kept this structure intact. Under the 1909 Act, which was in effect
throughout Laura Ingalls Wilder’s creative life, the initial term ran for twentyeight years from a work’s publication.10 If the author or (where the author was
dead) a statutory successor filed for renewal during the twenty-eighth year of
the work’s copyright life, the work was protected for a second term of twentyeight years.11 Our present Copyright Act did not alter the two-term structure
applicable to works published before January 1, 1978, but merely extended the
duration of the second term to forty-seven years, so that if the copyright were
timely renewed, any work protected under the prior act would enjoy a total of
seventy-five years protection from the date of its first publication.12 In
addition, the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, signed by President
Clinton in 1998, gave such works yet another twenty years of protection.13
The current statute that governs renewal of pre-1978 copyrights is 17
U.S.C. § 304(a). Subsection (1)(B), which comes verbatim from § 24 of the
1909 Act, provides that in the case of four particular types of work the renewal
copyright vests not in the author, as is normally the case, but rather in the
copyright proprietor as of the time the renewal vests.14 The only one of these
four exceptions that concerns us here is “any posthumous work,” a phrase that
we shall parse in due course. All types of work except these four are governed

4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
Act of May 31, 1790, Ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124.
See 17 U.S.C. § 10 (1976) (1909 Act) (superseded).
See 17 U.S.C. § 24 (1976) (1909 Act) (superseded).
Id.
Act of Feb. 3, 1831, Ch. 16, § 2, 4 Stat. 436.
17 U.S.C. § 24 (1976) (1909 Act) (superseded).
Id.
17 U.S.C. § 304(a) – (b) (1994 & Supp. IV 1999).
Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827 (1998).
17 U.S.C. § 304(a)(1)(B) (1994 & Supp. IV 1999).
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by subsection (1)(C), which also repeats verbatim the language of the 1909 Act
in establishing priorities vis-a-vis the right to renew.15 The person with the
highest priority is, of course, the author. If the author has not survived to the
time for renewal, next in priority is “the widow, widower, or children of the
author. . . .”16 If the author left no spouse or children but died testate, priority
to renew belongs to “the author’s executors,” not for their own benefit, of
course, but as fiduciaries for the devisees of the copyrights under the author’s
will.17 If the author left no spouse or children but died intestate, the priority
belongs to “his or her next of kin,” i.e., to the successors under the relevant law
of intestate succession.18 Thanks to this renewal structure, American copyright
law has been blessed or cursed with two bizarre features: contract-bumping,
which, up to a point, the legislators intended, and will-bumping, which was
never intended at all.
II. CONTRACT BUMPING IN A NETSHELL
In the nineteenth century it was customary for publishers to demand that
they be assigned all rights in whatever work they published, with the author in
return receiving either a flat sum or royalties. The purpose behind the renewal
structure of the Copyright Act was to give the author—or, after the 1831
revisions, the spouse and children of an author who died in a work’s first
term—a second chance to profit even if the author, during the work’s first
term, had conveyed all rights in the work to the publisher or anyone else. The
courts would have served that purpose most faithfully had they held that during
a work’s first term the author simply had no legal power to convey any
renewal-term rights. However, in Fred Fisher Music Publishing Co. v. M.
Witmark & Sons,19 the Supreme Court nullified Congressional intent in the
interest of contractual freedom and held that the author may convey renewal
term rights during a work’s initial term and is bound by that contract during the
renewal term if in fact he lives to renew.20 On the other hand, if the author dies
before renewal vesting, his statutory successors are not bound and the contract
is “bumped” when renewal vests in them.21

15. Id. § 304(a)(1)(C).
16. Id. § 304(c)(ii).
17. Id. § 304(c)(iii).
18. Id. § 304(c)(iv).
19. 318 U.S. 643 (1943).
20. Id. at 657-58.
21. In Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207 (1990), dealing with the contracts licensing Alfred
Hitchcock to adapt a short story by author Cornell Woolrich into Hitchcock’s 1954 film Rear
Window, the Court held that the same rules apply to contracts that authorize the making of a
derivative work, such as a movie based on the author’s source work. Id. at 220-21. If the author
dies before the commencement of the renewal term, as Woolrich did, the movie suffers what I
have dubbed “copyright death” and (unless the court fashions an ad hoc compulsory license
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If you are entering into a contract with an author, what can you do to keep
the contract from being bumped? The only feasible strategy is to require the
author’s spouse and children at the time of the deal to execute contingent
assignments of the relevant rights in the work during that work’s renewal term.
If the author lives to renew, he is bound by his contract under Fred Fisher and
there can be no bumping. If he doesn’t live to renew and those who signed the
contingent assignments make up the entire statutory successor class, they too
are bound under Fred Fisher and there can be no bumping. But if the
successor class turns out to include someone who didn’t execute a contingent
assignment—for example, if the author remarried or had one or more new
children after the movie deal was completed—at the beginning of the renewal
term the contract is pro tanto bumped. In other words, the threat of contract
bumping can be reduced but never completely eliminated.22
III. WILL BUMPING IN ANOTHER NETSHELL
Reasonable minds can differ as to how extensive a contract-bumping
function Congress intended the bifurcated structure of copyright law to
perform, but it seems there was clearly an intent to “bump” at least some
contracts that authors had executed in a work’s first term. What no legislators
seemed to have understood is that the two-term structure would give birth to a
bizarre interface between copyright law and the law of wills; but courts
throughout the twentieth century have consistently held that it did,23 and that it
operates in much the same manner as the interface between copyright and
contracts. If the author lives to renew a particular work and dies in the work’s
renewal term, his will governs rights during the rest of the work’s copyright
life. However, if he dies during the work’s first term, his will governs only for
the balance of the first term. By renewing the copyright for themselves, the
members of the statutory successor class, who enjoy a higher priority to renew
than a mere testamentary devisee, succeed in their own right to ownership of
the copyright. This is the phenomenon I have dubbed will-bumping. How are
the works of Laura Ingalls Wilder affected by this phenomenon?

without basis in the Copyright Act, as the Ninth Circuit did for Rear Window) becomes
unavailable to the American public until and unless the movie owner negotiates a new deal with
the statutory successors or their assignees. Section 304(a)(4)(A), enacted after Stewart v. Abend,
prevents the copyright death of a derivative work unless a formal renewal claim is filed in the
final year of the source work’s first term but bars the making of any new derivative works by the
derivative work owner during the source work’s renewal term even if no renewal claim is filed.
22. Because the 1976 Act creates a unitary copyright term governing all works created on or
after January 1, 1978, see 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (1994 & Supp. IV 1999), contract bumping is
impossible as to any such work. However, the right of termination constitutes something of a
functional equivalent as to such works. See id. § 203.
23. See, e.g., Nevins, supra note 3, at 96-102.
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During Wilder’s lifetime she published eight books in the so-called Little
House series: Little House in the Big Woods (1932), Farmer Boy (1933), Little
House on the Prairie (1935), On the Banks of Plum Creek (1937), By the
Shores of Silver Lake (1939), The Long Winter (1940), Little Town on the
Prairie (1941), and These Happy Golden Years (1943). She died on February
10, 1957, i.e., while each of these works was still in its first term. Her will left
all her copyrights to her daughter Rose Wilder Lane for the rest of Rose’s life,
and upon her death to the Laura Ingalls Library of Mansfield, Missouri. Rose,
the only member of the statutory successor class, arranged for the publication
of a ninth Little House book, On the Way Home (1962), the manuscript of
which she found in her mother’s papers. As each of the first six books in the
series entered its twenty-eighth year of copyright life, Rose in her own name
filed an application for the renewal of copyright in that title. She died on
October 30, 1968, which as chance would have it was the last day of year
twenty-eight in the copyright life of Little Town on the Prairie and therefore,
the last day before the renewal term of that work would begin. Rose had no
spouse or children and her own will left all the copyrights she owned to a
“friend” named Roger Lea MacBride, who reaped all the profits from the
hugely successful TV series (1974-83). The will of MacBride, who died in
1995, in turn left all the copyrights he owned to his daughter.Where do these
events leave the little library in rural Missouri which Laura Ingalls Wilder
clearly intended to own her copyrights after Rose’s death? I am serving as
consultant to the attorneys who represent the library and therefore cannot claim
objectivity, but I believe I can accurately set forth the contending claims.
IV. SIX BOOKS IN THE MAELSTROM
With regard to the first six titles in the Little House series, the MacBride
interests contend that the case is a simple application of the will-bumping
principles summarized above. Laura Ingalls Wilder happened to die in the first
term of each of those six books and Rose Wilder Lane happened to live
through the balance of each book’s first term. Therefore, for the balance of
each book’s first term, Rose owned its copyright because her mother’s will left
it to her for life. By filing renewals for each of those six books in her own
name—-not in her capacity as legatee under her mother’s will, but rather as the
sole member of the statutory successor class—-Rose converted the life estate
the will left her into fee simple title. Anyone who considers this an outrage to
common sense and against the clear testamentary intent of Laura Ingalls
Wilder, the author of the Little House books, should be referred to the words of
Justice Douglas in a landmark contract-bumping case: the result is required by
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the “symmetry and logic in the design of [the statute]. Whether it works at
times an injustice is a matter for the Congress, not for us.”24
It cannot be denied that the courts may wind up agreeing with that view.25
The argument for the Library, that will-bumping should not apply, is premised
on the view that the facts in this case are unique. Laura Ingalls Wilder’s
statutory successor class consisted at all times of one and only one person, her
daughter, and pursuant to Laura’s will, that person enjoyed the ownership of
all her mother’s copyright interests from the day Laura died till the day of her
own death. If the purpose of will-bumping is to make the disposition of an
author’s copyright interests into a sort of legitime for his or her spouse and
children, that purpose was fulfilled by the terms of Laura’s will. There can be
no policy justification for going further and demanding that upon the death of
the sole statutory class member the devolution of those interests should be
governed by the statutory successor’s will rather than by the author’s. No
reported case has ever carried will-bumping so far.
At least one case, however, seems to take it for granted that will-bumping
should be carried so far and perhaps even farther. Bartok v. Boosey & Hawkes,
Inc.26 dealt with the will of Bela Bartok (1881-1945).27 The great composer
and his first wife had had one child, Bela Jr. (1910-).28 After that marriage
ended in divorce, Bartok married the former Ditta Pasztory (1903-1982), by
whom he had a son named Peter (1924-).29 Bartok’s will left all his copyright
interests to Ditta during the balance of her life and to his sons in equal shares
upon her death.30 Under a 1949 agreement with Ditta and the sons, Bartok’s
publisher, Boosey & Hawkes, paid all royalties on the composer’s works into
his estate, which in turn distributed them pursuant to the will—i.e., exclusively
to Ditta as long as she remained alive. She was still alive at the time of the
landmark Second Circuit decision concerning her husband’s will.31
In a formal sense, the court decided only a narrow issue concerning the
composer’s last great work. Bartok, while still alive, had assigned to Boosey
& Hawkes the copyright in his Concerto for Orchestra, which had been
performed a number of times in his last years but was not actually published

24. Miller Music Co. v. Charles N. Daniels, Inc., 362 U.S. 373, 378 (1960).
25. See generally Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendants’ Motion to
Dismiss and Order Instructing All Parties to Attend Mediation, Wright County Library Bd. v.
Harper Collins Publishers, No. 99-3368 Civ. S3ECF (W.D. Mo. Feb. 10, 2000). In the order the
district court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss as to the first six Wilder titles, although
without any sustained analysis or serious consideration of the opposing arguments.
26. 523 F.2d 941 (2d Cir. 1975).
27. Id. at 942.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. See Bartok, 523 F.2d at 942 n.2.
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until March 1946, six months after his death. In 1974, the year the work had to
be renewed, competing renewal applications were filed by Boosey & Hawkes
and by Bartok’s younger son, Peter, who obviously was not on good terms
with his mother. The only issue before the court was whether on these facts
the Concerto should be deemed a “posthumous work.” If so, then it would
come within one of the four exceptions to the general rule, and, pursuant to
what is now §304(a)(1)(B)(i), the renewal by Boosey & Hawkes as “the
proprietor of [the] copyright” would be the only valid one, with the result that
royalties from the Concerto during its renewal term would continue to be paid
by the publisher to the estate and by the estate to Ditta alone for the balance of
her life.32 If, however, the court ruled that the Concerto did not count as a
“posthumous work,” then it would come within the general rule itself, and,
pursuant to what is now §304(a)(1)(C)(ii), the renewal by Peter on behalf of
the entire statutory successor class (himself, his half-brother, and his mother)
would be the only valid one, with the result that Bartok’s will would be pro
tanto bumped and the children would share in the royalties from the Concerto
even during the balance of Ditta’s life. The court held that a work
economically exploited during the author’s life but published only after his
death did not count as a “posthumous work.”33 The Concerto was thereby
thrown out of the ambit of Bartok’s will and the Boosey & Hawkes contract
and into the ambit of the will-bumping feature of the Copyright Act.
From the perspective of the MacBride interests, what is relevant to the
Laura Ingalls Wilder case is not the Bartok court’s narrow holding but its
apparent assumption that the iron logic of will-bumping brooks no exceptions.
But from the Library’s perspective, there is a crucial distinction between the
cases. What precluded Bartok from leaving the rights in the Concerto to Ditta
alone for the rest of her life was the fact that he had children, who shared the
same statutory renewal priority as his widow. The case would seemingly be on
point with the Wilder situation only if Bartok had not had children and if, his
will had left the rights in the Concerto to Ditta for the rest of her life and then,
let’s say, to a home for old composers. The fact that Laura Ingalls Wilder,
unlike Bartok, had one and only one statutory successor would seem to be a
crucial distinction that turns Bartok into a decision of very limited relevance.
V. THE RIDDLE OF THE SIXTH BOOK
Even if the court rejects the Library’s position vis-a-vis the first six Little
House titles as a group, there is a further issue surrounding the sixth book in
the series. According to § 24 of the 1909 Copyright Act, which was in force
throughout Laura Ingalls Wilder’s creative life, the initial term of any
copyright “shall endure for twenty-eight years from the date of first
32. Id.
33. Id. at 944-46.
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publication.”34 Although the 1909 statute was notorious for lack of definitions,
the term “date of publication” is defined in § 26:
In the interpretation and construction of this title ‘the date of publication’ shall
in the case of a work of which copies are reproduced for sale or distribution be
held to be the earliest date when copies of the first authorized edition were
placed on sale, sold, or publicly distributed. . . .35

According to Copyright Office records, the date of publication for The Long
Winter coincides with the date of its registration, October 30, 1940.36 Laura
Ingalls Wilder died in this work’s first term and Rose Wilder Lane filed for
renewal of the copyright in her own name during the twenty-eighth year of the
work’s copyright life. But she happened to die on October 30, 1968—scant
hours before the beginning of the first day of the work’s renewal term.37
Therefore a sound argument can be made that as to this title there was no
statutory successor class, so that pursuant to Laura’s will the Library has
owned The Long Winter since Rose’s death.
Resolution of this issue will require a judicial decision on an issue that has
vexed and divided courts for generations. It is undisputed that a renewal claim
can be filed only during the twenty-eighth year of a work’s copyright life. But
when within that year does the renewal right vest in the renewal claimant?
There are three possibilities. Vesting could be held to occur at (1) the
beginning of the last calendar year of the first term (Year Twenty-eight), (2) at
the date a renewal claim is actually filed, or (3) at the beginning of Year
Twenty-nine when the renewal term itself begins. In Frederick Music Co. v.
Sickler,38 the District Court for the Southern District of New York held that
renewal vests on the effective date of filing of a valid renewal claim.39 If the
court deciding the Wilder suit were to agree, the result would be that Rose’s
renewal of The Long Winter took precedence over Laura’s will. Melville and
David Nimmer, in their classic treatise on copyright, opt for the third
possibility, arguing that renewal does not vest unless the claimant—whether
the author or, as here, the statutory successor—survives into the beginning of

34. 17 U.S.C. § 24 (1976) (1909 Act) (superseded).
35. 17 U.S.C. § 26 (1976) (1909 Act) (superseded)
36. Document on file with the author.
37. This position follows the ruling in International Film Exchange, Ltd. v. Corinth Films,
Inc., 621 F. Supp 631, 634-35 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), that the first term of copyright runs from the first
day after the date of publication until the twenty-eighth anniversary of the publication date. Rule
6 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure likewise provides that in time computations under any
applicable statute “the day of the act [or] event. . .from which the designated period of time
begins to run shall not be included. The last day of the period so computed shall be included. . . .”
Id.
38. 708 F. Supp. 587 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
39. Id. at 592.
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Year Twenty-nine.40 In Marascalco v. Fantasy, Inc.,41 the Ninth Circuit
agreed with and adopted the Nimmer view. Accordingly, it will be one of the
tasks of the attorneys for the Wright County Library to convince the Eighth
Circuit to follow suit.
VI. SEVEN AND EIGHT, LAY THEM STRAIGHT
However problematic the above argument may be as it applies to The Long
Winter, there can be scant doubt of its validity vis-a-vis Little Town on the
Prairie (1941) and These Happy Golden Years (1943), the last two Little
House books published in Laura Ingalls Wilder’s lifetime. These works were
due for renewal respectively in 1969 and 1971. Rose Wilder Lane died before
the earliest day on which renewal applications for these works could have been
filed. Since will-bumping does not take place unless at least one member of
the statutory successor class is alive as of the vesting of renewal rights, it
follows that after Rose Wilder Lane’s death the true copyright owner of these
two works has been the Wright County Library. One might describe this as a
situation where it’s the will of a statutory successor, rather than the author,
which is bumped by the Copyright Act.
A case that comes close to being identical with the Wilder situation is
Capano Music v. Myers Music, Inc.42 Max Freedman died in the first term of
the early rock-n-roll hit “Rock Around the Clock,” which he had co-authored.43
His statutory successor class consisted of one and only one person, his wife
Ray, who in turn died before the earliest possible date of vesting of the renewal
term in the song.44 In these respects, Capano is identical to the situation
regarding the seventh and eighth Little House books. The cases differ in that
Freedman’s will left his wife all the copyright interest he owned in the work,
while Laura Ingalls Wilder’s will left her daughter only a life estate.45
Following what he took to be the iron structure of the 1909 Copyright
Act’s renewal provision, re-enacted verbatim in §304(a) of the 1976 Act, Judge
Carter in Capano held that
the renewal rights could not vest, first, in the author, Max Freedman, because
he was not alive at the time of vesting. Second, the rights could not vest in Ray
Freedman as Max Freedman’s widow because she, too, was not alive when the
vesting date arrived. Third, the rights could not vest in the executor . . . of Max
Freedman’s estate, because [that person] was Ray Freedman, and, as noted, she

40. MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, 3 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, § 9.05[C] (1978
& Supp. 1999).
41. See 953 F.2d 469 (9th Cir. 1991).
42. 605 F. Supp. 692 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
43. Id. at 693.
44. Id.
45. Id.
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was not living at the time of vesting. . . . Consequently, the renewal rights
passed, fourth, to whoever was Max Freedman’s next of kin on vesting day.46

The first two links in this chain of reasoning are clearly correct, but at the
third step Judge Carter just as clearly lost his way. Whether or not the
executor of the author’s estate is alive as of the date of renewal vesting is
irrelevant, for in the absence of a spouse or child of the author who survived to
that date, the renewal copyright passes to the executor not in his or her own
right but for the benefit of whoever was left the work in the author’s will. But
since Max Freedman’s will had left virtually his entire estate, including all his
copyright interest in “Rock Around the Clock,” to his wife, there was nothing
in that document relevant to his intent in the event she should die before the
vesting of renewal rights. This is why, despite flawed reasoning, the Capano
court was correct in awarding the copyright interest to Freedman’s intestate
successors. But, as should be crystal clear by this point, the crucial distinction
between Capano and the Wilder case is precisely that Laura Ingalls Wilder’s
will did contain a clear provision dealing with ownership of her works after
Rose Wilder Lane’s death. Therefore, it seems beyond dispute that that
provision should govern ownership of the works Rose did not live to renew.
VII. THE PUZZLE OF THE POSTHUMOUS PUBLICATIONS
As we have seen, after her mother’s death Rose Wilder Lane arranged for
publication of one new Little House title, On The Way Home (1962). After
Rose’s death her testamentary devisee Roger Lea MacBride arranged for
publication of two additional posthumous books by Laura Ingalls Wilder: The
First Four Years (1971) and West From Home (1974). The crucial factors
these works have in common are (1) that they remained unpublished in Laura’s
lifetime and (2) that Rose did not live into the renewal term for any of them. It
seems clear to me that since Rose’s death these works have been owned by the
Wright County Library.47
This conclusion is supported to differing degrees by two arguments. The
weaker of the pair is based on the premise that will-bumping does not take
place unless the author’s will bequeathed the rights in a work that obtained
statutory copyright in the author’s lifetime by virtue of its publication. With
regard to these three works this simply is not the case. As of Laura Ingalls
Wilder’s death they were not covered by federal copyright at all but only by
so-called common law copyright. On the Way Home was published in Rose
Wilder Lane’s lifetime and with her permission, whereas the other two works
were published only after Lane’s death. Before its publication each of these

46. Id. at 695-96.
47. See supra note 25. The district court denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss as to the
posthumous Wilder works.
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three works was protected only by common-law copyright, which upon
publication was lost and replaced by statutory copyright.
What makes this argument relatively weak is that the only reported case
with somewhat similar facts may have reached the opposite conclusion. As we
have seen, the court in Bartok held that the Concerto for Orchestra, which was
performed in Bartok’s lifetime but not published until six months after his
death, was not a “posthumous work” under the renewal scheme of the 1909
Copyright Act.48 That decision took the Concerto out of the ambit of Bartok’s
will and within the ambit of the will-bumping phenomenon so that, despite the
composer’s clear intent to the contrary, his sons would share in the royalties
from the Concerto while his widow was still alive. The court never considered
whether the bequest of the Concerto might not be subject to bumping because
as an unpublished work it was protected only by common-law copyright at
Bartok’s death, but de facto its holding would seem an implicit repudiation of
this thesis. Nevertheless, if a court today could be persuaded either that the
Second Circuit never ruled on this precise issue or that it did and was wrong,
the Wright County Library might still prevail as to these three posthumous
works of Laura Ingalls Wilder based on the theory that their publication after
Laura’s death (and, with regard to two of the three books, after Rose’s death
also) did not subject these works to the will-bumping phenomenon.
The Library seems more likely to prevail vis-a-vis the three posthumously
published titles with a second argument, which is based on Capano49 and was
advanced in Section VI above vis-a-vis the two works published in Laura’s
lifetime that Rose didn’t live to renew. Laura’s will, unlike Max Freedman’s,
contained language clearly expressing her intent as to copyright ownership of
her works after her statutory successor’s death.
The will-bumping
phenomenon may deprive her of testamentary freedom over those of her works
which Rose lived to renew but Laura’s will should control over those works
that were still in their initial copyright term when Rose died.
VIII. IT CAN’T HAPPEN TODAY—OR CAN IT?
By this point the reader must be wondering whether will-bumping
threatens the estate plans of authors still alive today. The only accurate answer
is typically lawyeresque: Yes and No.
First, the No side. The current Copyright Act made a large number of
radical alterations to prior law. All works created on or after January 1, 1978
are protected not under a two-term scheme but for a single unitary term lasting
for the life of the author plus fifty (recently amended to seventy) years.50 No
48. 523 F.2d at 944-46.
49. See supra Part VI.
50. See 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (1994 & Supp. IV 1999); Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827
(1998).
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work created on or after January 1, 1978 ever needs to be renewed.51 And
since no such work is subject to the bifurcated structure of prior law, no
testamentary disposition of such a work is subject to being bumped.
Now, the Yes side. Every work that was protected by statutory copyright
prior to January 1, 1978 remains subject to the renewal scheme of the earlier
statute including its will-bumping feature.52 Section 304(a)(3)(B), enacted in
1992, ended the requirement of formal renewal and made all renewals
automatic but did nothing to alter the will-bumping phenomenon.53 Keeping in
mind (a) that the last possible publication date for a work coming under the old
regime was December 31, 1977, (b) that the initial term of copyright protection
under that regime lasted for twenty-eight years, and (c) that the statute of
limitations extends for three years, it would seem that the last possible date on
which a cause of action like the Wilder case could commence would be
December 31, 2008. Of course, if the facts of a particular controversy, like
those in the Wilder case, permit the argument that the statute should be tolled,
a case of this nature might arise many years after the apparent cutoff date. If
so, there may well be some employment opportunities and intellectual
challenges decades in the future for attorneys who take the time to make
themselves at home in the wonderful world of will-bumping.
On the assumption that readers of this essay may wish to join that select
group, I close with an examination question. For the last thirty years Wally
Wordsmith has written a series of hugely successful adventure novels. He
comes to you in November 1999 as this essay is being written and asks you to
prepare his estate plan. Being one of his millions of readers, you are aware that
his works include The Skull of the Stuttering Gunfighter (1968), Toads Die on
Tuesday (1971), The Boy Who Blew the Bezuzu (1974), Fish Priest of the
Galapagos (1978) and a host of more recent novels. Wally has a wife and
children but wants to provide for them generously with other property and
leave his copyright interests to a charitable foundation. To what extent is he
allowed to do this?
In skeletal form the answer is as follows. With regard to Fish Priest of the
Galapagos and all his later titles Wally has full testamentary freedom because
none of those works are subject to the bifurcated scheme with its will-bumping
feature. With regard to The Skull of the Stuttering Gunfighter, which was
automatically renewed in 1996, he also has full testamentary freedom because
he has lived into its renewal term even if his jurisdiction were to follow
Marascalco and hold that he must live at least until the first day of Year
Twenty-nine in a work’s copyright life. With regard to Toads Die on Tuesday,
which was automatically renewed in 1999, and The Boy Who Blew the Bezuzu,
51. 17 U.S.C. § 302 (1994 & Supp. IV 1999).
52. Id. § 304.
53. Pub. L. No. 102-307, 106 Stat. 264 (1992).
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which will be automatically renewed in 2001, whether he has testamentary
freedom depends on how long he lives and, if he should die during year
twenty-eight in the copyright life of one of those works, on whether his
jurisdiction accepts or rejects Marascalco.
An attorney today who is planning the estate of one of the countless still
living authors in Wally Wordsmith’s situation has only one strategy at his or
her disposal to counter the threat of will-bumping: the same strategy that, as
we saw in Section II above, is available to counter the threat of contractbumping when someone is entering into an inter vivos agreement with an
author. At the time the author’s estate is being planned, his or her then spouse
and children must be asked to execute contingent assignments of their renewal
expectancies to the author. If the author lives beyond renewal vesting as to a
particular work, there can be no will-bumping and the contingent assignments
as to that work become irrelevant. If the author dies before renewal vesting
and if the statutory successor class consists entirely of people who executed
contingent assignments, they are bound by those assignments and there can be
no will bumping. But if the author dies before renewal vesting and the
successor class includes one or more people who didn’t execute contingent
assignments—for example, a later-acquired spouse or after-born child—the
will is pro tanto bumped. As to works predating 1978 the threat can be
reduced but never completely eliminated.
The days of copyright law’s meddling with authors’ testamentary freedom
are drawing to a close. Each year until the end of 2005, authors run the risk
that their testamentary bequest of pre-1978 works entering their renewal term
that year will be bumped. But at the close of business on December 31, 2005,
the last date on which any pre-1978 copyright can conceivably begin its
renewal term, most, if not all, of the will-bumping phenomenon will have
faded forever into history. Will-bumping was created inadvertently and grew
haphazardly, its desirability was never subjected to any sort of policy debate,
and it remains unknown even today to countless authors, whose freedom it
irrationally curtails, and countless attorneys who are charged with the
responsibility of planning authors’ estates. Let us shed no tears for its coming
demise as it lurches along the road to its inevitable end.
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